Skip navigation
Skip navigation

Pareto improvement through unilateral matching of public good contributions: The role of commitment

Buchholz, Wolfgang; Cornes, Richard; Peters, Wolfgang; Rubbelke, Dirk


When providing public goods through voluntary contributions, a donor may introduce unilateral matching in order to reduce underprovision of the public good and thus inefficiency. By itself, however, matching benefits the donor but harms the recipient. We

CollectionsANU Research Publications
Date published: 2015
Type: Journal article
Source: Economics Letters
DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2015.04.003


File Description SizeFormat Image
01_Buchholz_Pareto_improvement_through_2015.pdf445.18 kBAdobe PDF    Request a copy
02_Buchholz_Pareto_improvement_through_2015.pdf445.18 kBAdobe PDF    Request a copy

Items in Open Research are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.

Updated:  19 May 2020/ Responsible Officer:  University Librarian/ Page Contact:  Library Systems & Web Coordinator