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Interior matching equilibria in a public good economy: An aggregative game approach

Buchholz, Wolfgang; Cornes, Richard; Rubbelke, Dirk

Description

If the equilibrium generated by a matching mechanism is to be the desired Pareto optimal outcome, it is necessary for every player to be at an interior solution at that equilibrium. Using the aggregative game approach developed by Cornes and Hartley (2003, 2007), this paper analyzes the conditions under which matching mechanisms in a public good economy lead to interior matching equilibria at which all agents make strictly positive flat contributions to the public good. In particular, we show...[Show more]

CollectionsANU Research Publications
Date published: 2011
Type: Journal article
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/1885/67617
Source: Journal of Public Economics
DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.12.010

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