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Fully aggregative games

Cornes, Richard; Hartley, Roger


A game is fully aggregative if payoffs and marginal payoffs depend only on a player's own strategy and a function of the strategy profile which is common to all players. We characterize the form which this function must take in such a game and show that the game will be strategically equivalent to another game in which the function is the simple sum of strategies.

CollectionsANU Research Publications
Date published: 2012
Type: Journal article
Source: Applied Economics Letters
DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2012.06.024


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