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Knightian games and robustness to ambiguity

Stauber, Ronald

Description

This paper introduces a notion of robustness to ambiguous beliefs for Bayesian Nash equilibria. An equilibrium is robust if the corresponding strategies remain approximately optimal for a class of games with ambiguous beliefs that results from an appropriately defined perturbation of the belief structure of the original non-ambiguous belief game. The robustness definition is based on a novel definition of equilibrium for games with ambiguous beliefs that requires equilibrium strategies to be...[Show more]

CollectionsANU Research Publications
Date published: 2011
Type: Journal article
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/1885/64457
Source: Journal of Economic Theory
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2010.08.008

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