Knightian games and robustness to ambiguity
This paper introduces a notion of robustness to ambiguous beliefs for Bayesian Nash equilibria. An equilibrium is robust if the corresponding strategies remain approximately optimal for a class of games with ambiguous beliefs that results from an appropriately defined perturbation of the belief structure of the original non-ambiguous belief game. The robustness definition is based on a novel definition of equilibrium for games with ambiguous beliefs that requires equilibrium strategies to be...[Show more]
|01_Stauber_Knightian_games_and_robustness_2011.pdf||241.86 kB||Adobe PDF|| Request a copy|
|02_Stauber_Knightian_games_and_robustness_2011.pdf||1.28 MB||Adobe PDF|| Request a copy|
Items in Open Research are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.