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Monsters in Kaplan's logic of demonstratives

Rabern, Brian


Kaplan (1989a) insists that natural languages do not contain displacing devices that operate on character-such displacing devices are called monsters. This thesis has recently faced various empirical challenges (e.g., Schlenker 2003; Anand and Nevins 2004

CollectionsANU Research Publications
Date published: 2012
Type: Journal article
Source: Philosophical Studies
DOI: 10.1007/s11098-012-9855-1


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