Voting on pensions: Sex and marriage
Existing political economy models of pensions focus on age and productivity. In this paper we incorporate two additional individual characteristics: sex and marital status. We ignore the role of age, by assuming that people vote at the start of their life, and characterize the preferred rate of taxation that finances a Beveridgean pension scheme when individuals differ in wage, sex and marital status. We allow for two types of couples: one-breadwinner and two-breadwinner couples. Marriage pools...[Show more]
|Collections||ANU Research Publications|
|Source:||European Journal of Political Economy|
|01_Marie-Louise _Voting_on_pensions:_Sex_and_2011.pdf||336.7 kB||Adobe PDF||Request a copy|
|02_Marie-Louise _Voting_on_pensions:_Sex_and_2011.pdf||368.88 kB||Adobe PDF||Request a copy|
Items in Open Research are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.