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Rationality and Indeterminate Probabilities

Hajek, Alan; Smithson, Michael


We argue that indeterminate probabilities are not only rationally permissible for a Bayesian agent, but they may even be rationally required. Our first argument begins by assuming a version of interpretivism: your mental state is the set of probability and utility functions that rationalize your behavioral dispositions as well as possible. This set may consist of multiple probability functions. Then according to interpretivism, this makes it the case that your credal state is indeterminate. Our...[Show more]

CollectionsANU Research Publications
Date published: 2011
Type: Journal article
Source: Synthese
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-011-0033-3


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