Rationality and Indeterminate Probabilities
We argue that indeterminate probabilities are not only rationally permissible for a Bayesian agent, but they may even be rationally required. Our first argument begins by assuming a version of interpretivism: your mental state is the set of probability and utility functions that rationalize your behavioral dispositions as well as possible. This set may consist of multiple probability functions. Then according to interpretivism, this makes it the case that your credal state is indeterminate. Our...[Show more]
|Collections||ANU Research Publications|
|01_Hajek_Rationality_and_Indeterminate_2011.pdf||313.98 kB||Adobe PDF||Request a copy|
|02_Hajek_Rationality_and_Indeterminate_2011.pdf||56.1 kB||Adobe PDF||Request a copy|
Items in Open Research are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.