Strategy-Proof Mechanisms for Interdependent Task Allocation with Private Durations
Classical mechanism design assumes that an agent's value of any determined outcome depends only on its private information. However in many situations, an agent's value of an outcome depends on the private information of other agents in addition to its private information. In such settings where agents have interdependent valuations, strategy-proof mechanisms have not been proposed yet, and when these mechanisms are possible is still an open research question. Toward addressing this question,...[Show more]
|Collections||ANU Research Publications|
|Source:||Proceedings of International Conference on Principles and Practice of Multi-Agent Systems (PRIMA 2011)|
|01_Ghoneim_Strategy-Proof_Mechanisms_for_2011.pdf||219.54 kB||Adobe PDF||Request a copy|
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