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Enforcement and over-compliance

Shimshack, Jay; Ward, Michael

Description

Economists generally view environmental enforcement as a tool to secure compliance with regulations. This paper demonstrates that credible enforcement significantly increases statutory over-compliance with regulations as well. We find that many plants with discharges typically below legally permitted levels reduce discharges further when regulators issue fines, even on other plants. Also, non-compliant plants often respond to sanctions by reducing discharges well beyond reductions required by...[Show more]

CollectionsANU Research Publications
Date published: 2008
Type: Journal article
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/1885/50195
Source: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management
DOI: 10.1016/j.jeem.2007.05.003

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