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The game theoretic analysis of the amakudari practice in the Japanese banking system

Asano, Akihito; Eto, Takaharu


The amakudari practice in the Japanese banking system officials from the Ministry of Finance obtaining post-retirement jobs in private banks is analysed within a game theoretic framework. We consider a game in which asymmetric information between depositors and banks regarding banks riskiness exists. Banks may hire amakudari officials to signal their riskiness, even when they are not contributing to improving banks projects. Various equilibria emerge depending upon productivity of officials,...[Show more]

CollectionsANU Research Publications
Date published: 2003
Type: Working/Technical Paper


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