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Aggregating sets of judgments: an impossibility result

List, Christian; Pettit, Philip


The concern of this paper is the aggregation of sets of rationally connected judgments that the members of a group individually endorse into a corresponding, collectively endorsed set of judgments. After documenting the need for various groups to aggregate judgments, we explain how this task is challenged by the "doctrinal" or "discursive" paradox. We then show that this paradox is not just an artifact of certain specific situations, but that it actually illustrates a new impossibility theorem,...[Show more]

CollectionsANU Research Publications
Date published: 2000
Type: Working/Technical Paper


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