Consequentialism, rationality and the relevant description of outcomes

Abstract

This paper is organized as follows. In section 2 I introduce two fundamental consequentialist assumptions. First, the notion that considerations that are irrelevant from the perspective of the agent’s values should not determine her choices. Secondly, the assumption that consequentialism is forward-looking. I argue that Mom’s 3 preferences violate either the former or the latter. Section 3 discusses three possible responses to these violations; in particular the idea that one could save both expected utility theory and consequentialism, by re-describing the relevant outcomes. Section 4 discusses the worry of some theorists that such a move might rob both consequentialism (and expected utility theory) from its normative content. It focuses mainly on Broome’s idea of rational justifiers. Section 5 discusses Broome’s special response to cases like the one under discussion, thus clearing the way for the argument of section 6, that consequentialism is incompatible with outcome descriptions that invoke fairness. Sections 7 and 8 discuss the question whether the consequentialist principles introduced in section 2 are acceptable for a consequentialist. I argue that they are at the very heart of what consequentialism entails. However, since they exclude from deliberation notions of fairness, guilt, disappointment, and regret, they are unacceptable as requirements of rationality. Section 9 summarizes the main conclusions and speculates about the implications for expected utility theory as a theory of rational choice.