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Bargaining Power and Efficiency in Principal-Agent Relationships

Quiggin, John; Chambers, R. G


Agrarian contracts such as sharecropping are frequently modelled as principal agent relationships. Although it is commonly assumed that the principal has complete freedom to design the contract, the problem formulation in much of the principal agent literature presumes that the sharecropping contract is constrained-Paretoefficient. In the present paper, we consider the implications of a richer specification of the choices available to peasants. In particular, we consider the entire spectrum of...[Show more]

CollectionsANU Research Publications
Date published: 2001
Type: Working/Technical Paper


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