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Network externalities and institutional adaptation

Le, Nhat


This paper presents a dynamic framework that explains how a set of institutions emerges when players extrapolate across multiple games. It explores the existence of a fundamental circularity whereby the high convention in one game reinforces the high convention in others, and vice versa, such that one possible outcome is a socially advantageous regime combining the high conventions. Likewise, the low conventions also reinforce one another to form a socially disadvantageous regime. A...[Show more]

CollectionsANU Research Publications
Date published: 2002
Type: Working/Technical Paper


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