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Decentralization, incentives, and asset ownership

Le, Nhat


This paper develops a model to explain why mass privatization can become troublesome when taking into account asymmetry of information and economies of scale. It also shows that, in early stages of reforms, organizational form is irrelevant, but cooperation among the contractual parties is necessary for efficiency. We then incorporates repeated-game framework into the model to study how property rights are gradually formed in China and how informal social mechanisms work to promote cooperation....[Show more]

CollectionsANU Research Publications
Date published: 2002
Type: Working/Technical Paper


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