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How do auditors perceive CEO's risk-taking incentives?

Fargher, Neil; Jiang, Li Wei (Alicia); Yu, Yangxin


Prior literature documents that executive compensation influences managerial risk preferences through executives' portfolio sensitivities to changes in stock prices (delta) and stock-return volatility (vega). Large deltas discourage managerial risk-taking

CollectionsANU Research Publications
Date published: 2013
Type: Journal article
Source: Accounting and Finance
DOI: 10.1111/acfi.12044


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