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Frege's Puzzle and the Objects of Credence

Chalmers, David


The objects of credence are the entities to which credences are assigned for the purposes of a successful theory of credence. I use cases akin to Frege's puzzle to argue against referentialism about credence: the view that objects of credence are determined by the objects and properties at which one's credence is directed. I go on to develop a non-referential account of the objects of credence in terms of sets of epistemically possible scenarios.

CollectionsANU Research Publications
Date published: 2011
Type: Journal article
Source: Mind: a quarterly review of philosophy
DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzr046


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