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Trembles in extensive games with ambiguity averse players

Aryal, Gaurab; Stauber, Ronald


We introduce and analyze three definitions of equilibrium for finite extensive games with imperfect information and ambiguity averse players. In a setting where players’ preferences are represented by maxmin expected utility, as characterized in Gilboa and Schmeidler (J Math Econ 18(2):141–153, 1989), our definitions capture the intuition that players may consider the possibility of slight arbitrary mistakes. This generalizes the idea leading to trembling-hand perfect equilibrium as introduced...[Show more]

CollectionsANU Research Publications
Date published: 2014
Type: Journal article
Source: Economic Theory
DOI: 10.1007/s00199-014-0828-9


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