Skip navigation
Skip navigation

A note on Kuhn's Theorem with ambiguity averse players

Aryal, Gaurab; Stauber, Ronald


Kuhn's Theorem shows that extensive games with perfect recall can equivalently be analyzed using mixed or behavioral strategies, as long as players are expected utility maximizers. This note constructs an example that illustrates the limits of Kuhn's Theorem in an environment with ambiguity averse players who use a maxmin decision rule and full Bayesian updating.

CollectionsANU Research Publications
Date published: 2014
Type: Journal article
Source: Economics Letters
DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2014.08.018


File Description SizeFormat Image
01_Aryal_A_note_on_Kuhn's_Theorem_with_2014.pdf403.03 kBAdobe PDF    Request a copy

Items in Open Research are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.

Updated:  19 May 2020/ Responsible Officer:  University Librarian/ Page Contact:  Library Systems & Web Coordinator