Testing for collusion in asymmetric first-price auctions
This paper proposes a two step procedure to detect collusion in asymmetric first-price procurement (auctions). First, we use a reduced form test to short-list bidders whose bidding behavior is at-odds with competitive bidding. Second, we estimate the (latent) cost for these bidders under both competition and collusion setups. Since for the same bid the recovered cost must be smaller under collusion - as collusion increases the mark-up - than under competition, detecting collusion boils down to...[Show more]
|Collections||ANU Research Publications|
|Source:||International Journal of Industrial Organization|
|01_Aryal_Testing_for_collusion_in_2013.pdf||392.91 kB||Adobe PDF||Request a copy|
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