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Moral Fictionalism Versus the Rest

Nolan, Daniel; Restall, Greg; West, Caroline

Description

In this paper we introduce a distinct metaethical position, fictionalism about morality. We clarify and defend the position, showing that it is a way to save the 'moral phenomena' while agreeing that there is no genuine objective prescriptivity to be described by moral terms. In particular, we distinguish moral fictionalism from moral quasi-realism, and we show that fictionalism possesses the virtues of quasi-realism about morality, but avoids its vices.

CollectionsANU Research Publications
Date published: 2005
Type: Journal article
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/1885/34102
Source: Australasian Journal of Philosophy
DOI: 10.1080/00048400500191917

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