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Asymmetric Contests with General Technologies

Cornes, Richard; Hartley, Roger

Description

We investigate the pure-strategy Nash equilibria of asymmetric, winner-take-all, imperfectly discriminating contests, focussing on existence, uniqueness and rent dissipation. When the contest success function is determined by a production function with decreasing returns for each contestant, there is a unique pure-strategy equilibrium. If marginal product is also bounded, limiting total expenditure is equal to the value of the prize in large contests even if contestants differ. Partial...[Show more]

CollectionsANU Research Publications
Date published: 2005
Type: Journal article
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/1885/33284
Source: Economic Theory
DOI: 10.1007/s00199-004-0566-5

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