Skip navigation
Skip navigation

Vindicating the Normativity of Rationality

Southwood, Nicholas

Description

I argue that the why be rational? challenge raised by John Broome and Niko Kolodny rests upon a mistake that is analogous to the mistake that H.A. Pritchard famously claimed beset the 'why be moral?' challenge. The failure to locate an independent justification for obeying rational requirements should do nothing whatsoever to undermine our belief in the normativity of rationality. I suggest that we should conceive of the demand for a satisfactory vindicating explanation of the normativity of...[Show more]

dc.contributor.authorSouthwood, Nicholas
dc.date.accessioned2015-12-08T22:21:25Z
dc.identifier.issn0014-1704
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1885/32135
dc.description.abstractI argue that the why be rational? challenge raised by John Broome and Niko Kolodny rests upon a mistake that is analogous to the mistake that H.A. Pritchard famously claimed beset the 'why be moral?' challenge. The failure to locate an independent justification for obeying rational requirements should do nothing whatsoever to undermine our belief in the normativity of rationality. I suggest that we should conceive of the demand for a satisfactory vindicating explanation of the normativity of rationality instead in terms of the demand for a philosophical characterisation of rationality that can do something to explain why rational requirements are the kinds of things that are, by their very nature, normative. I consider several accounts that have recently been offered � the distinctive-object account, the proper functioning account, and the subjective reasons account � and argue that none succeeds in meeting this challenge. I then sketch a new account, the �first-personal authority account�, which holds that rational requirements are what I call �standpoint-relative demands� concerning the attitudes we ought to have and form; and that complying with rational requirements is a matter of honouring our first-personal authority as agents. I suggest that the first-personal authority account does a better job of meeting the challenge.
dc.publisherUniversity of Chicago Press
dc.sourceEthics: an International journal of social, political and legal philosophy
dc.titleVindicating the Normativity of Rationality
dc.typeJournal article
local.description.notesImported from ARIES
local.identifier.citationvolume119
dc.date.issued2008
local.identifier.absfor220305 - Ethical Theory
local.identifier.absfor220304 - Epistemology
local.identifier.ariespublicationu4193696xPUB89
local.type.statusPublished Version
local.contributor.affiliationSouthwood, Nicholas, College of Arts and Social Sciences, ANU
local.description.embargo2037-12-31
local.bibliographicCitation.issue1
local.bibliographicCitation.startpage9
local.bibliographicCitation.lastpage30
local.identifier.doi10.1086/592586
dc.date.updated2015-12-08T08:35:19Z
local.identifier.scopusID2-s2.0-58749088936
CollectionsANU Research Publications

Download

File Description SizeFormat Image
01_Southwood_Vindicating_the_Normativity_of_2008.pdf101.99 kBAdobe PDF    Request a copy


Items in Open Research are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.

Updated:  19 May 2020/ Responsible Officer:  University Librarian/ Page Contact:  Library Systems & Web Coordinator