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Lessons from a virtual slime: marginal mechanisms, minimal cognition and radical enactivism

Walmsley, Lachlan


Radical enactivism (REC) and similar embodied and enactive approaches to the mind deny that cognition is fundamentally representational, skull-bound and mechanistic in its organisation. In this article, I argue that modellers may still adopt a mechanistic strategy to produce explanations that are compatible with REC. This argument is scaffolded by a multi-agent model of the true slime mould Physarum polycephalum.

CollectionsANU Research Publications
Date published: 2020
Type: Journal article
Source: Adaptive Behaviour
DOI: 10.1177/1059712318824544


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