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Agenda Control, Intraparty Conflict, and Government Spending in Asia: Evidence from South Korea and Taiwan

Yap, O. Fiona


In nations where the executive has budgetary control, how are spending decisions and allocations affected? Is intraparty conflict relevant? This article sets out to show that institutional rules and leadership roles affect budgetary outcomes. It makes the following argument: if intraparty conflict exists in a one-party dominant or majority-party system, the executive reduces spending to punish the party in the legislature; if no intraparty conflict exists, then the executive increases spending...[Show more]

CollectionsANU Research Publications
Date published: 2006
Type: Journal article
Source: Journal of East Asian Studies
DOI: 10.1017/S1598240800000047


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