Probabilities of Counterfactuals and Counterfactual Probabilities
Probabilities figure centrally in much of the literature on the semantics of conditionals. I find this surprising: it accords a special status to conditionals that other parts of language apparently do not share. I critically discuss two notable 'probabilities first' accounts of counterfactuals, due to Edgington and Leitgeb. According to Edgington, counterfactuals lack truth values but have probabilities. I argue that this combination gives rise to a number of problems. According to Leitgeb,...[Show more]
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|Source:||Journal of Applied Logic|
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