The Securitisation of Xinjiang: The Role of Domestic and International Sources on the Policy Shift in 2016-2017

Abstract

Why and how has there been an intensification of securitisation, surveillance and introduction of 're-education' in Xinjiang in 2016-17? Between 2016 and 2017, the Chinese government began a campaign of mass internment of Uyghurs in Xinjiang, rounding up large numbers of the Uyghur ethnic minority population and placing them into 'vocational education and training centres' At the same time there was a major expansion of monitoring and surveillance of the Chinese Muslim population in Xinjiang. What explains the timing of the intensification of securitisation, surveillance and mass internment of Uyghurs, which occurred following a relative decline in the frequency and scale of attacks between 2015 and 2016?

In the current literature, there are at least three prevailing explanations for the shift: the role of personal leadership, a general policy trend towards greater assimilation, and the threat of Uyghur militancy overseas. However, the literature tends to treat these factors in isolation. Focusing on the drivers of the shift, this dissertation suggests a nuanced relationship of convergence between each of these international and domestic-level factors identified in the extant literature and additional material and ideational sources that have contributed to the policy change between 2016 and 2017.

Domestic political drivers include, the recentralisation of power by Xi Jinping under the core leadership of CCP, which has led to an overall centralisation of the security institutional bureaucracy and the dominance of security officials on the official policy-formation agenda in Xinjiang; a general trend towards a more radical, assimilationist approach to enhancing security and stability in Xinjiang, which saw an overlap of national security concerns with the management of the Uyghur ethnic minorities in Xinjiang; the change in focus from 'leapfrog development' as a means of achieving the central government's goals in Xinjiang, to the emphasis on 'social stability and enduring peace' at the second central Xinjiang work forum held in 2014; and the historical antecedents of the PRC's policy of managing the Uyghurs in Xinjiang. International political drivers include the increased evidence of Uyghur militancy abroad between 2012 and 2016 against the backdrop of the Syrian conflict; the securitisation of international sources of the terrorism threat in Xinjiang by Chinese academics and security officials during this period; and an increase in proposals to deal with the root causes of the terrorism threat in Xinjiang.

Moreover, the policy shift in 2016-2017 has also been underpinned by the availability of new surveillance technologies, and the interest and popularity of Chinese political elites to use technological tools as a means for political and social control. Consequently, the CCP's embrace of new technologies to govern has resulted in the growing experimentation by the Chinese security bureaucracy to govern and control its territory and population, including ethnic minorities, through surveillance technologies. Another driver for the change in policy strategy in 2016-2017 has been the CCP's adaptation of global 'de-radicalisation' and counterterrorism strategies to the Chinese context. Within the political establishment there has been a growing consensus of the need for 'de-radicalisation' and counterterrorism with 'Chinese characteristics' which was marked by a clear evolution in the systematisation, legalisation and bureacratisation of 'de-extremization'/'de-radicalisation' work in Xinjiang. Last but not least, the perceived failures of earlier policies to address the root causes of instability in Xinjiang which are rooted in domestic political institutional structures, is another source which contributed to the policy change. Domestic political structures play a role in shaping cadre behaviour and determine how local cadres implement security policy on the ground in Xinjiang.