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Nuclear weapons, the United States and alliances in Europe and Asia: Toward an institutional perspective

Fruehling, Stephan; O'Neil, Andrew

Description

America’s alliances in Europe and East Asia all involve some institutional cooperation on U.S. nuclear weapons policy, planning or employment—from consultative fora in Asia to joint policy and sharing of nuclear warheads in NATO. Such cooperation is often analyzed through the prism of “extended nuclear deterrence,” which focuses on the extension of U.S. security guarantees and their effect on potential adversaries. This article argues that this underplays the importance of institutional...[Show more]

dc.contributor.authorFruehling, Stephan
dc.contributor.authorO'Neil, Andrew
dc.date.accessioned2021-08-22T23:25:36Z
dc.identifier.issn1352-3260
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1885/244957
dc.description.abstractAmerica’s alliances in Europe and East Asia all involve some institutional cooperation on U.S. nuclear weapons policy, planning or employment—from consultative fora in Asia to joint policy and sharing of nuclear warheads in NATO. Such cooperation is often analyzed through the prism of “extended nuclear deterrence,” which focuses on the extension of U.S. security guarantees and their effect on potential adversaries. This article argues that this underplays the importance of institutional factors: Allies have historically addressed a range of objectives through such cooperation, which has helped to catalyze agreements about broader alliance strategy. The varied form such cooperation takes in different alliances also flows from the respective bargaining power of allies and the relative importance of consensus, rather than perceived threats. The article concludes that nuclear weapons cooperation will remain crucial in successful U.S. alliance management, as allies negotiate their relationship with each other in the face of geostrategic change.
dc.description.sponsorshipResearch for this article has been funded as part of the Australian Research Council project DP140101478 Extended Nuclear Deterrence and the Restraint of Non-Nuclear Allies: Material Cooperation and Strategic Dialogue.
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoen_AU
dc.publisherRoutledge, Taylor & Francis Group
dc.rights© 2016 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
dc.sourceContemporary Security Policy
dc.subjectNuclear weapons
dc.subjectalliances
dc.subjectinstitutions
dc.subjectNATO
dc.subjectAsia
dc.subjectdeterrence
dc.titleNuclear weapons, the United States and alliances in Europe and Asia: Toward an institutional perspective
dc.typeJournal article
local.description.notesImported from ARIES
local.identifier.citationvolume38
dc.date.issued2017
local.identifier.absfor160604 - Defence Studies
local.identifier.ariespublicationu5727300xPUB205
local.publisher.urlhttp://www.routledge.com/
local.type.statusAccepted Version
local.contributor.affiliationFruehling, Stephan, College of Asia and the Pacific, ANU
local.contributor.affiliationO'Neil, Andrew, Griffith University
dc.relationhttp://purl.org/au-research/grants/arc/DP140101478
local.bibliographicCitation.issue1
local.bibliographicCitation.startpage4
local.bibliographicCitation.lastpage25
local.identifier.doi10.1080/13523260.2016.1257214
local.identifier.absseo940301 - Defence and Security Policy
dc.date.updated2020-11-23T10:53:28Z
local.identifier.scopusID2-s2.0-85001915798
local.identifier.thomsonID000211791000002
dcterms.accessRightsOpen Access
dc.provenancehttps://v2.sherpa.ac.uk/id/publication/5110...."accepted version can be made open access on institutional repository" from SHERPA/RoMEO site (as at 25/08/21).
CollectionsANU Research Publications

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