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Counterfactual Success and Negative Freedom

Dowding, Keith; van Hees, Martin


Recent theories of negative freedom see it as a value-neutral concept; the definition of freedom should not be in terms of specific moral values. Specifically, preferences or desires do not enter into the definition of freedom. If preferences should so enter then Berlin's problem that a person may enhance their freedom by changing their preferences emerges. This paper demonstrates that such a preference-free conception brings its own counterintuitive problems. It concludes that these problems...[Show more]

CollectionsANU Research Publications
Date published: 2007
Type: Journal article
Source: Economics and Philosophy
DOI: 10.1017/S0266267107001344


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