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A metarepresentational theory of intentional identity

Sandgren, Alexander


Geach points out that some pairs of beliefs have a common focus despite there being, apparently, no object at that focus. For example, two or more beliefs can be directed at Vulcan even though there is no such planet. Geach introduced the label 'intentional identity' to pick out the relation that holds between attitudes in these cases; Geach says that '[w]e have intentional identity when a number of people, or one person on different occasions, have attitudes with a common focus, whether or...[Show more]

CollectionsANU Research Publications
Date published: 2017
Type: Journal article
Source: Synthese
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-017-1609-3


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