A brave new world? Kantian-Nashian interaction and the dynamics of global climate change mitigation
We model game-theoretic situations in which agents motivated by Kantian ethics interact with conventional Nashian agents. We define the concept of generalized Kant-Nash equilibrium which encompasses the Nash equilibrium, the Kantian equilibrium and the Kant-Nash equilibrium as special cases. We show the existence and uniqueness of a Kant-Nash equilibrium in a static game of climate change mitigation, and derive its properties. In a dynamic setting, we analyze a differential game of climate...[Show more]
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|Source:||European Economic Review|
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