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When and How the Punishment Must Fit the Crime

Mailath, George; Nocke, Volker; White, Lucy


In repeated normal‐form (simultaneous‐move) games, simple penal codes (Abreu, Journal of Economic Theory 39(1) (1986), 191–225; and Econometrica 56(2) (1988), 383–96) permit an elegant characterization of the set of subgame‐perfect outcomes. We show that in repeated extensive‐form games such a characterization no longer obtains. By means of examples, we identify two types of settings in which a subgame‐perfect outcome may be supported only by a profile with the property that the continuation...[Show more]

CollectionsANU Research Publications
Date published: 2017
Type: Journal article
Source: International Economic Review
DOI: 10.1111/iere.12219


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