Log Rolling as an Explanation of Distortions All Round: A Model à la Buchanan and Tullock

Abstract

Since at least the time of Adam Smith, economists have been alive to the vision of a relatively small number of ‘special interests’ benefiting themselves at the expense of the public weal. But distortions are today so endemic, it is tempting to say that every interest manages to secure that status of special interest, and receives some ‘distortion’ in its favour. But, however credible this scenario of ‘universal distortions’ may be, can it be provided a rigorous and well-articulated modelling in terms of maximising choices, under a specified institutional structure? Can Public Choice suggest such a modelling? Can, in particular, the Public Choice theorising of ‘log rolling’ do so? It is argued here that the Public Choice theorising of log rolling (Buchanan and Tullock 1962) can provide such a rationalisation, as its framework can be stretched to admit the possibility of ‘distortions all round’. The word ‘stretch’ is used advisedly: the unhappy possibility of ‘distortions all round’ is perhaps unrepresentative of the more optimistic bent of the Public Choice theory of log rolling. Yet, the pessimistic possibility still has value as a corrective to the overly hopeful account that Buchanan and Tullock originally provided of log rolling.