Credence: A Belief-First Approach
This paper explains and defends a belief-first view of the relationship between belief and credence. On this view, credences are a species of beliefs, and the degree of credence is determined by the content of what is believed. We begin by developing what we take to be the most plausible belief-first view. Then, we offer several arguments for it. Finally, we show how it can resist objections that have been raised to belief-first views. We conclude that the belief-first view is more plausible...[Show more]
|Collections||ANU Research Publications|
|Source:||Canadian Journal of Philosophy|
|Access Rights:||Open Access after embargo|
|01_Moon_Credence%3A_A_Belief-First_2020.pdf||306.48 kB||Adobe PDF||Request a copy|
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