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Offsetting Uncertainty: Reassurance with Two-Sided Incomplete Information

Haynes, Kyle; Yoder, Brandon


Conventional models of bargaining and reassurance under incomplete information assume that actors’ behavioral signals are objectively cooperative or noncooperative. Even if actors are uncertain of each other’s preferences, they know what types of actions the other will view as cooperative. Yet on many real-world issues, cooperation is subjective, and what constitutes a cooperative action is conditional on the receiver’s preferences. We present a formal model showing that in these cases,...[Show more]

CollectionsANU Research Publications
Date published: 2020
Type: Journal article
Source: American Journal of Political Science
DOI: 10.1111/ajps.12464
Access Rights: Open Access


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