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The evolution of awareness

Grant, Simon; Quiggin, John


We consider an evolutionary approach to how awareness is determined in games where players are not necessarily aware of all possible strategies. We begin with the standard notion of evolutionarily stable equilibrium, in which potential players pursue a fixed strategy. This constitutes a minimal level of awareness, since players are not required to know anything about the game or to reason about their opponents. We then consider the introduction of players with greater awareness.

CollectionsANU Research Publications
Date published: 2017-12
Type: Journal article
Source: Journal of Economic Psychology
DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2017.01.010


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