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Risk aversion in symmetric and asymmetric contests

Cornes, Richard; Hartley, Roger

Description

We analyze existence, uniqueness and properties of equilibria in incompletely discriminating Tullock contests with logistic contest success functions, when contestants are risk averse. We prove that a Nash equilibrium for such a contest exists, but give an example of a symmetric contest with both symmetric and asymmetric equilibria, showing that risk aversion may lead to multiple equilibria. Symmetric contests have unique symmetric equilibria but additional conditions are necessary for general...[Show more]

CollectionsANU Research Publications
Date published: 2009
Type: Journal article
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/1885/20645
Source: Economic Theory
DOI: 10.1007/s00199-009-0490-9

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