Risk aversion in symmetric and asymmetric contests
We analyze existence, uniqueness and properties of equilibria in incompletely discriminating Tullock contests with logistic contest success functions, when contestants are risk averse. We prove that a Nash equilibrium for such a contest exists, but give an example of a symmetric contest with both symmetric and asymmetric equilibria, showing that risk aversion may lead to multiple equilibria. Symmetric contests have unique symmetric equilibria but additional conditions are necessary for general...[Show more]
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