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Understanding self-ascription

Jackson, Frank; Stoljar, Daniel


David Lewis argues that believing something is self-ascribing a property rather than holding true a proposition. But what is self-ascription? Is it some new mysterious primitive? Is Lewis saying that every belief you have is about you? Several recent authors have suggested that, in the light of these questions, Lewis's theory should be rejected, despite its enormous influence. But this neglects the fact that Lewis makes two relevant proposals about belief: one about belief de se, another...[Show more]

CollectionsANU Research Publications
Date published: 2019
Type: Journal article
Source: Mind and Language
DOI: 10.1111/mila.12237


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