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Democracy as a Game of Trust: The Limits of Generality Constraints

Oprea, Alexandra


Unconstrained majoritarian democracy is often bitterly partisan, economically inefficient, and subject to rent-seeking by powerful interest groups. Can we improve upon these outcomes without abandoning popular democratic institutions such as decisions by simple majority rule? In Politics by Principle, not Interest, Buchanan and Congleton (1998) argue that we can. They propose a generality principle that would constitutionally prohibit majorities from favoring members of dominant coalitions or...[Show more]

CollectionsANU Research Publications
Date published: 2019-12-06
Type: Journal article
Source: Homo Oeconomicus
DOI: 10.1007/s41412-019-00092-7


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