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A Defense of Intrapersonal Belief Permissivism

Jackson, Elizabeth


Permissivism is the view that there are evidential situations that rationally permit more than one attitude toward a proposition. In this paper, I argue for Intrapersonal Belief Permissivism (IaBP): that there are evidential situations in which a single agent can rationally adopt more than one belief-attitude toward a proposition. I give two positive arguments for IaBP; the first involves epistemic supererogation and the second involves doubt. Then, I should how these arguments give...[Show more]

CollectionsANU Research Publications
Date published: 2019-07-11
Type: Journal article
Source: Episteme
DOI: 10.1017/epi.2019.19


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