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Demandingness as a Virtue

Goodin, Robert


Philosophers who complain about the ?demandingness' of morality forget that a morality can make too few demands as well as too many. What we ought be seeking is an appropriately demanding morality. This article recommends a ?moral satisficing' approach to determining when a morality is ?demanding enough', and an institutionalized solution to keeping the demands within acceptable limits.

CollectionsANU Research Publications
Date published: 2009
Type: Journal article
Source: Journal of Ethics, The
DOI: 10.1007/s10892-007-9025-4


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