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A consequentialist account of Narveson's dictum

Cusbert, John; Kath, Robyn


In population ethics, Narveson’s dictum states: morality favours making people happy, but is neutral about making happy people. The thought is intuitively appealing; for example, it prohibits creating new people at the expense of those who already exist. However, there are well-known obstacles to accommodating Narveson’s dictum within a standard framework of overall betterness: any attempt to do so violates very plausible formal features of betterness (notably transitivity). Therefore, the...[Show more]

CollectionsANU Research Publications
Date published: 2018-03-26
Type: Journal article
Source: Philosophical Studies
DOI: 10.1007/s11098-018-1085-8


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