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Do Publicly Signalled Earnings Management Incentives Affect Analyst Forecast Accuracy?

Wilson, Mark; Wu, Yi (Ava)


Using a panel of listed Australian firms for the years 1999-2007, this paper investigates whether analysts' forecast efficiency is improved by the occurrence of a publicly observable event, such as a CEO appointment, which signals a firm's earnings management incentives. Two supporting hypotheses are also tested: first, that CEO appointments are associated with income-decreasing earnings management; and second, that analyst forecast errors increase with the level of earnings management present...[Show more]

CollectionsANU Research Publications
Date published: 2011
Type: Journal article
Source: Abacus
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-6281.2011.00343.x


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