The rational impermissibility of accepting (some) racial generalizations
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I argue that inferences from highly probabilifying racial generalizations (e.g. believing that Jones is a janitor, on the grounds that most Salvadoreans at the school are janitors) are not solely objectionable because acting on such inferences would be problematic, or they violate a moral norm, but because they violate a distinctively epistemic norm. They involve accepting a proposition when, given the costs of a mistake, one is not adequately justified in doing so. First I sketch an account of...[Show more]
dc.contributor.author | Bolinger, Renee Jorgensen | |
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dc.date.accessioned | 2019-10-17T01:56:56Z | |
dc.identifier.issn | 0039-7857 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/1885/177011 | |
dc.description.abstract | I argue that inferences from highly probabilifying racial generalizations (e.g. believing that Jones is a janitor, on the grounds that most Salvadoreans at the school are janitors) are not solely objectionable because acting on such inferences would be problematic, or they violate a moral norm, but because they violate a distinctively epistemic norm. They involve accepting a proposition when, given the costs of a mistake, one is not adequately justified in doing so. First I sketch an account of the nature of adequate justification—practical adequacy with respect to eliminating the ~p possibilities from one’s epistemic statespace. Second, I argue that inferences based on demographic generalizations tend to disproportionately expose group members to the risks associated with mistakenly assuming stereotypical propositions, and so magnify the wrong involved in relying on such inferences without adequate justification. | |
dc.description.sponsorship | Work on this paper was supported by ARC Grant D170101394. | |
dc.format.extent | 17 pages | |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | |
dc.language.iso | en_AU | |
dc.publisher | Springer International Publishing AG | |
dc.rights | © Springer Science+Business Media B.V., part of Springer Nature 2018. This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in Synthese. The final authenticated version is available online at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-1809-5 | |
dc.source | Synthese | |
dc.subject | Epistemology | |
dc.subject | Acceptance | |
dc.subject | Generalizations | |
dc.subject | Statistical evidence | |
dc.subject | Moral encroachment | |
dc.subject | Epistemic risk | |
dc.title | The rational impermissibility of accepting (some) racial generalizations | |
dc.type | Journal article | |
local.description.notes | Imported from ARIES | |
local.identifier.citationvolume | 197 | |
dcterms.dateAccepted | 2018-05-08 | |
dc.date.issued | 2018-05-23 | |
local.identifier.absfor | 220319 - Social Philosophy | |
local.identifier.ariespublication | u1050297xPUB1 | |
local.publisher.url | https://link.springer.com/ | |
local.type.status | Accepted Version | |
local.contributor.affiliation | Bolinger, Renee, College of Arts and Social Sciences, The Australian National University | |
dc.relation | http://purl.org/au-research/grants/arc/D170101394 | |
local.identifier.essn | 1573-0964 | |
local.bibliographicCitation.issue | 6 | |
local.bibliographicCitation.startpage | 2415–2431 | |
local.identifier.doi | 10.1007/s11229-018-1809-5 | |
local.identifier.absseo | 970122 - Expanding Knowledge in Philosophy and Religious Studies | |
dc.date.updated | 2022-02-20T07:21:20Z | |
local.identifier.scopusID | 2-s2.0-85047243114 | |
dcterms.accessRights | Open Access | |
dc.provenance | http://sherpa.ac.uk/romeo/issn/0039-7857/ Author can archive post-print (ie final draft post-refereeing). Author's post-print on any open access repository after 12 months after publication (Sherpa/Romeo as of 17/2/2020) | |
Collections | ANU Research Publications |
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