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Puzzling Pierre and Intentional Identity

Sandgren, Alexander

Description

This paper concerns Kripke’s puzzle about belief. I have two goals in this paper. The first is to argue that two leading approaches to Kripke’s puzzle, those of Lewis and Chalmers, are inadequate as they stand. Both approaches require the world to supply an object that the relevant intentional attitudes pick out. The problem is that there are cases which, I argue, exhibit the very same puzzling phenomenon in which the world does not supply an object in the required way. The second goal is to...[Show more]

CollectionsANU Research Publications
Date published: 2018
Type: Journal article
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/1885/176984
Source: Erkenntnis: An International Journal of Scientific Philosophy
DOI: 10.1007/s10670-018-9984-9

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