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The paradox of limited deposit insurance under the amakudari practice in the Japanese banking system

Asano, Akihito; Eto, Takaharu


Changing deposit insurance from full to limited in 2005 is expected to discipline Japanese banks' behaviour because depositors will start monitoring their banks. However, this discipline effect may be overturned due to the amakudari practice in the Japanese banking system where regulatory officials obtain post-retirement jobs in private banks. We consider a signalling game where depositors and banks have asymmetric information regarding banks' riskiness, and banks use amakudari officials to...[Show more]

CollectionsANU Research Publications
Date published: 2006
Type: Journal article
Source: Journal of Asian Economics
DOI: 10.1016/j.asieco.2005.10.010


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