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Moral error theories and folk metaethics

Fraser, Benjamin


In this paper, I distinguish between two error theories of morality: one couched in terms of truth (ET1); the other in terms of justification (ET2). I then present two arguments: the Poisoned Presupposition Argument for ET1; and the Evolutionary Debunking Argument for ET2. I go on to show how assessing these arguments requires paying attention to empirical moral psychology, in particular, work on folk metaethics. After criticizing extant work, I suggest avenues for future research.

CollectionsANU Research Publications
Date published: 2014
Type: Journal article
Source: Philosophical Psychology
DOI: 10.1080/09515089.2013.769144


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