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Ramm, Brentyn


Hume famously denied that he could experience the self. Most subsequent philosophers have concurred with this finding. I argue that if the subject is to function as a bearer of experience it must (1) lack sensory qualities in itself to be compatible with bearing sensory qualities and (2) be single so that it can unify experience. I use Douglas Harding’s first-person experiments to investigate the visual gap where one cannot see one’s own head. I argue that this open space conforms to the above...[Show more]

CollectionsANU Research Publications
Date published: 2017
Type: Journal article
Source: Journal of Consciousness Studies


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