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On having bad persons as friends

Isserow, Jessica

Description

Intuitively, one who counts a morally bad person as a friend has gone wrong somewhere. But it is far from obvious where exactly they have gone astray. Perhaps in cultivating a friendship with a bad person, one extends to them certain goods that they do not deserve. Or perhaps the failure lies elsewhere; one may be an abettor to moral transgressions. Yet another option is to identify the mistake as a species of imprudence—one may take on great personal risk in counting a bad person as a friend....[Show more]

dc.contributor.authorIsserow, Jessica
dc.date.accessioned2019-05-29T06:23:39Z
dc.identifier.issn0031-8116‎
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1885/163727
dc.description.abstractIntuitively, one who counts a morally bad person as a friend has gone wrong somewhere. But it is far from obvious where exactly they have gone astray. Perhaps in cultivating a friendship with a bad person, one extends to them certain goods that they do not deserve. Or perhaps the failure lies elsewhere; one may be an abettor to moral transgressions. Yet another option is to identify the mistake as a species of imprudence—one may take on great personal risk in counting a bad person as a friend. In this paper, I argue that none of these intuitive explanations are entirely convincing; for many such proposals run contrary to widely accepted features of friendship. However, they do point us in the direction of a more satisfying explanation—one which concerns a person’s moral priorities. An individual who counts a morally bad person as a friend is, I propose, one who betrays a distinct kind of defect in her values.
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoen_AU
dc.publisherSpringer Netherlands
dc.rights© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2017
dc.sourcePhilosophical Studies
dc.titleOn having bad persons as friends
dc.typeJournal article
local.description.notesImported from ARIES
local.identifier.citationvolume175
dc.date.issued2018
local.identifier.absfor220319 - Social Philosophy
local.identifier.ariespublicationu4485658xPUB1442
local.publisher.urlhttps://link.springer.com
local.type.statusPublished Version
local.contributor.affiliationIsserow, Jessica, College of Arts and Social Sciences, ANU
local.description.embargo2037-12-31
local.bibliographicCitation.issue12
local.bibliographicCitation.startpage3099
local.bibliographicCitation.lastpage3116
local.identifier.doi10.1007/s11098-017-0996-0
local.identifier.absseo970122 - Expanding Knowledge in Philosophy and Religious Studies
dc.date.updated2019-03-17T07:16:45Z
local.identifier.scopusID2-s2.0-85031944864
local.identifier.thomsonID000448297600008
CollectionsANU Research Publications

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