Voices and Votes Amid Violence: Power and Electoral Accountability in Thailand's Deep South

Abstract

Given the complex political context of Thailand's Deep South, this thesis asks how and why the people in Yala, Pattani, and Narathiwat voted as they did. From my interviews with villagers in the Deep South and observations of the region's political culture, I argue that the majority of voters in make rational calculations to gain the most from their electoral choices. Villagers base their voting decisions on such considerations as their organizational affiliations, which political candidate provides money for votes, their ability to respond to intimidation from vote-canvassers, political party platforms and candidates' competence and charisma. All these factors contribute significantly to how villagers' choices when voting. This thesis distinguishes between two different types of violence: single catastrophic violence or what I shall call 'massive violence', and daily violent incidents or 'chronic daily violence'. 'Massive violence' refers to major clashes between the state authorities and civilians. It impacts heavily upon civilians, both psychologically and physically. By contrast, 'chronic daily violence' happens on a regular but smaller scale, and creates less trauma. The number of casualties in chronic daily violence is less than that with massive violence and is less likely to be widely reported.

This thesis has two central findings in explaining voting behaviour in the Deep South's violent context. First, after an occurrence of massive violence has a deeply disruptive effect on politics. It serves to increase voter's participation levels and also heighten opposition to the government. One reason for this is that news of massive violence spreads quickly and shapes public consciousness on the security and political situation. Since people of the same communities share similar grievances, they may also share the same sense of anger and grievance when massive violence occurs. Political candidates and vote-canvassers may have more difficulty persuading and influencing voters because voters already have the direct information that empowers them to make resolute choices in the election. Second, prolonged and chronic violence tends to alter pre-exisiting political and social system, particularly those based on patron-client relations, without necessarily favouring opposition forces. It makes patrons, many of whom are also political candidates, more vulnerable, because they are wary to visit remote villages and meet directly with electors due to the fear of being attacked. As a result, political candidates have to rely more heavily on their vote-canvassers, which usually lessens candidates' control over on-the-ground campaigning. As long as chronic violence persists in the Deep South, the traditional patron-client system will remain intact and vote-buying rampant as candidates have less direct contact with their electorates. Thus, violence impacts on political structures and culture in Thailand's Deep South. Massive violence tends to disadvantage ruling parties and incumbent politicians whereas ongoing violence alters the normal balance of patron-client relations. I also conclude that voters in Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat make strategic use of elections to respond to conditions in their region. The ballot box is a relatively safe form for expressing political preferences. In this way, this thesis addresses the previous neglect of electoral behavior in the context of violence.